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Abstract
Linkage of national cap-and-trade systems is typically advocated by economists on a gen-
eral analogy with the beneficial linkage of free-trade areas and on the specific grounds that 
linkage will ensure cost effectiveness among the linked jurisdictions. The paper analyses 
the less obvious effects of linkage with the bottom–up approach of the Paris Agreement 
where each country sets its nationally determined contribution for its own carbon diox-
ide ( CO
2
 ) emissions. An appropriate and widely accepted specification for the damages of 
CO
2
 emissions within a relatively short (say 5–10 year) period is that marginal damages 
for each jurisdiction are constant (although they can differ among jurisdictions). With this 
defensible assumption, the analysis is significantly clarified and yields simple closed-form 
expressions for all CO
2
 permit prices. Some implications for linked and unlinked voluntary 
CO
2
 cap-and-trade systems are derived and discussed. A numerical example illustrates the 
results.
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1 Introduction
Abatement of carbon dioxide ( CO
2
 ) emissions is today’s premier global public good.1 It is 
difficult enough to resolve a local public goods problem within a jurisdiction having effec-
tive governance with an ability to levy payments. But when the problem is international in 
scope, and where there is no overarching top–down international governance structure, it 
can render a global public goods problem virtually unsolvable.
The key issue here is the notorious free-rider problem. Everyone wants to free ride off 
the contributions of others. A jurisdiction bears the full costs of its abatement, but it only 
reaps a fraction of the global benefits. The result is a non-cooperative selfish equilibrium 
where everyone abates far less than would be socially desirable in a cooperative solution. 
The key issue is that it takes a strong government to enforce a socially desirable coop-
erative solution. In the global arena there is no such strong international government with 
powers to assign CO
2
 emissions targets and enforce penalties for non-compliance.
Reduced to its core essence, the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) is strictly a bot-
tom–up voluntary agreement based on a periodically repeated ‘pledge and review’ pro-
cess. Just before a performance period, at the end of the previous performance period, each 
country volunteers a ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC) for its own CO
2
 emis-
sions. After a performance period (5 years), actual emissions should be reported but there 
are no penalties for a country not complying with its own volunteered NDC. In this sense 
the Paris Agreement is doubly voluntary: The self-announced pledges are strictly voluntary 
in the first place, and compliance with the previous self-announced pledges in the perfor-
mance period is also strictly voluntary. The Agreement talks about developed countries 
aiding developing countries with financial support for ‘sustainability’ based on climate 
mitigation and adaptation, but the cash flows have thus far been meager.
Not surprisingly, there has been broad take-up of such a strictly voluntary agreement. 
Before the U.S. dropped out, the Paris Agreement nominally covered countries accounting 
for some 97 per cent of world CO
2
 emissions (see e.g. Chen 2017). There is widespread 
acknowledgement that the highly under-ambitious NDCs actually named are not nearly 
enough to keep global warming on a track below the stated goal of no more than a world-
wide average temperature increase of 2 ◦C (see e.g. Levin and Fransen 2015).
On the positive side, the Paris Agreement has highlighted the importance to the interna-
tional community of dealing with climate change. And it encourages credibly transparent 
standards of reporting, monitoring, and verification by each participating country, which is 
a necessary first step for any accord. The Paris Agreement also contains a commitment for 
countries to pledge, review, and re-pledge new intended NDCs periodically (every 5 years), 
hopefully inspiring ever-greater levels of NDC ambition over time (Paragraphs 4.8–4.9).
What is the underlying ‘model’ of human behavior that might allow the Paris Agree-
ment to be seen as a step toward a resolution of the climate-change externality? There 
appears to be an implicit assumption here that CO
2
 polluters will significantly drive down 
their emissions voluntarily based largely on altruism and ‘blame and shame’ from others, 
without any top–down setting of emissions targets or enforcement of penalties for non-
compliance. If only everyone followed the full golden rule, the global-warming problem 
could be solved. The Paris Agreement might then be seen as a first tentative step toward 
1 For expositional simplicity we pretend that carbon dioxide ( CO
2
 ) is the only greenhouse gas (GHG). CO
2
 
is by a wide margin the most important GHG, but it is not the only GHG.
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demonstrating the spirit of golden-rule-like behavior, which might hopefully inspire fur-
ther steps toward even more golden-rule-like behavior by inspiring ever-more-ambitious 
NDC targets in a virtuous circle.
There seems to be little question but that some jurisdictions throughout the world 
have gone beyond the most narrow definition of pure self-interest in proposing relatively 
more ambitious emissions targets, even if this level of ambition still falls well short of full 
golden-rule behavior. Altruism may thus help somewhat, and is to be encouraged, although 
it remains to see whether and to what extent ambitious emission targets will be met. Gener-
ally, most economists would express at least partial skepticism about the golden-rule model 
because it is typically difficult to resolve free-rider problems by altruism alone. This paper 
goes to the opposite extreme of altruistic behavior by examining the consequences of a 
model of pure self interest.
A jurisdictional cap-and-trade system assigns allowances of CO
2
 caps to emitters within 
a jurisdiction and then allows (or even encourages) internal free trade in permits. Total 
emissions of CO
2
 must equal the sum of all allocated caps. Regulators of a cap-and-trade 
system can thus control the total amount of CO
2
 emissions within their jurisdiction by con-
trolling the sum of all allocated caps. As economists have long emphasized, a cap-and-
trade system is cost effective because it minimizes total abatement costs for each chosen 
level of total CO
2
 emissions via ensuring that every emitter in the jurisdiction sets its mar-
ginal cost of abatement equal to the equilibrium price of permits.
Economists have typically advocated linkage of different cap-and-trade jurisdictions by 
rough analogy with the beneficial linkage of free-trade areas and on the more specific basis 
that this will ensure cost effectiveness among the linked jurisdictions.2 An unlinked cap-
and-trade system guarantees cost effectiveness only within its own jurisdiction. A linked 
cap-and-trade system goes further by also ensuring cost effectiveness among the linked 
jurisdictions taken as a whole.
The argument for linkage based on cost effectiveness might make sense when there is 
an overall top–down governance structure that can force Pareto-improving side payments 
among the linked participants. But absent such a powerful overall governance structure, 
this cost-effectiveness argument in a strictly voluntary cap-and-trade system loses its force. 
Cap-and-trade jurisdictions that have linked their cap-and-trade systems will issue their 
own voluntary caps on the basis of a host of domestic political-economy considerations 
including, prominently, self interest. Narrow self interest, which is being modeled in this 
paper as if it were the sole motivation, will cause linked jurisdictions to pay relatively little 
attention to what is for them a strictly hypothetical argument about minimization of overall 
compliance costs. Be that as it may, there is a widespread feeling among most economists 
that linking cap-and-trade jurisdictions is a good idea.
The generally favorable attitude toward linking has found its way into the Paris Agree-
ment. Paragraph 6.2 of the agreement outlines a framework for recognizing traded obli-
gations (called ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’) so that double count-
ing is avoided because a party to the agreement is allowed to include traded reductions 
undertaken by another party to count toward the first party’s NDC. Paragraph 6.3 states 
that: ‘The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally 
determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by 
2 See, for example, the extremely comprehensive article of Mehling et al. (2017), and the numerous further 
references they cite.
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participating parties’. The inclusion of articles 6.2 and 6.3 opens the door to linking cap-
and-trade systems (or, indeed, any market-based mechanisms).
While linking may give some jurisdictions incentives to choose more ambitious caps, it 
could also give other jurisdictions incentives to choose less ambitious caps. It is a seeming 
paradox that cap-and-trade among the parties to the Paris Agreement might lead to even 
higher emissions. If linking cap-and-trade systems does little more than replace one non-
cooperative equilibrium with another, it will still be a far cry from the more cooperative 
outcome that might accompany a genuine international governance structure.
The insight that linking voluntary cap-and-trade systems may lead to higher levels of 
pollution emissions is not new.3 The most complete rigorous analysis of this possibility is 
the pioneering work of Helm (2003), who models both unlinked and linked cap-and-trade 
systems as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium among self-interested countries. With a 
fairly general treatment of environmental pollution damages, he finds that overall effects on 
total emissions are ambiguous and he derives moderately complicated conditions for when 
pollution is increased or decreased by linking. He addresses some additional results with 
the use of quadratic abatement costs functions.
In the present analysis all theoretical results are based on quite general assumptions 
about abatement cost functions. In the theoretical analysis we found it desirable to stick to 
this assumption because there is lack of an empirical basis for the assumption that quad-
ratic cost functions represent a realistic approximation. However, an appropriate and widely 
accepted specification for the damages of CO
2
 emissions within a relatively short (5–10 
year) period is that marginal damages are constant for each jurisdiction (although they can 
differ among jurisdictions). With this defensible assumption, which the existing literature 
has not yet focused upon, the analysis is significantly clarified and yields simple closed-
form expressions for all (linked and unlinked) CO
2
 permit prices. Some sharp insights are 
then available. How a linked jurisdiction sets its voluntary caps relative to actual emis-
sions (and whether the jurisdiction buys or sells CO
2
 permits) is fully characterized by a 
simple linear proportionality condition that depends only on the difference between the 
jurisdiction’s marginal damages and the average marginal damages of the entire linked sys-
tem. Some implications for linked and unlinked voluntary CO
2
 cap-and-trade systems are 
derived and discussed. The theoretical analysis and its implications are illustrated with a 
numerical example. In this part of the paper we have specified the abatement cost functions 
as quadratic while the marginal damages are constant (as in the theoretical parts).
2  The Model
The emphasis in the model of this paper is on clarity of exposition and the appealing sim-
plicity of clean crisp analytical results. Hopefully the model embodies enough of ‘reality’ 
to give some useful insights on an important issue.
Let there be a total of n ( ≥ 2) jurisdictions. Throughout this paper we economize on 
notation by not redundantly pointing out that index i always runs from i = 1, 2,… , n or that 
index j always runs from j = 1, 2,… , n . Henceforth it is understood that i (or j) refer to one 
of the n jurisdictions under consideration.
3 Early preliminary intimations of this tendency are expressed in Bohm (1992), Eyckmans and Proost 
(1996), and Krishna and Tan (1999). This issue is also discussed later in Green et al. (2014) and in Mehling 
et al. (2017).
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For each i, the marginal damage of emissions within a pledge-and-review cycle is given 
as di . The marginal damages curve is thus assumed here to be flat in emissions flows. This 
assumption, which is standard in the climate-change literature, is appropriate for CO
2
 emis-
sions because it is the stock of accumulated CO
2
 that does the damage and the relatively 
small flow of CO
2
 emissions within, say, a 5–10 year period has an effectively linear impact 
on the overall stock of atmospheric CO
2
 . Let ei represent the emissions flow of jurisdiction 
i. Let Di(E) denote the total damage to jurisdiction i of total emissions E ≡
∑
ei and let 
D�
i
(E) represent the marginal damage to jurisdiction i of total emissions E. Then we are 
assuming here that
and the {di} coefficients thus provide an unambiguous ordering of the marginal damages of 
emissions among the n cap-and-trade jurisdictions.4 The constancy of marginal damages 
for each jurisdiction, which is a natural assumption for CO
2
 , allows for a simplification of 
results, which seemingly has not been taken full advantage of in this literature.
On the abatement cost side, let Ci(ei) denote the cost to jurisdiction i of emissions ei , 
where C�
i
(ei) < 0 and C
��
i
(ei) > 0 . Note, importantly, that the marginal cost of abatement for 
jurisdiction i is minus C�
i
(ei).
Let p be an exogenously imposed tax-price on emissions (it does not matter what is the 
source of the tax-price p, so long as it is perceived as exogenous). Let ei here represent the 
emissions quantity reaction of jurisdiction i to the tax-price p. The functional relationship 
between ei and p is given by the condition that marginal abatement cost equals price, or
Let the function ei(p) represent the inverse of the marginal cost of abatement function 
−C�
i




(p) < 0 because C��
i
(ei) > 0.
The two simple specifications (1) (which is very specific to CO
2
 ), and (3) (which is 
entirely general for any cost functions {Ci(ei)} with C
��
i
(ei) > 0 ) constitute the analytical 
framework for the study of unlinked and linked voluntary cap-and-trade systems investi-
gated in this paper.5
(1)D�i(E) = di,
(2)p = −C�i (ei).
(3)ei = ei(p),
4 Note that, other things being equal, jurisdictions with higher (lower) populations will tend to have larger 
(smaller) marginal damages of total emissions.
5 We can only hope in this paper that, as is often the case in economic theory, an analytically-tractable flow 
model, standing in for a more complicated stock-flow situation, is capable of offering some useful insights. 
We have in mind here a pledge-and-review cycle of maybe 5–10 years or so, which may be short enough to 
justify the model specification here.
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3  Unlinked Cap‑and‑Trade Systems
Independent unlinked jurisdiction i seeks to minimize over ei the expression Di(E) + Ci(ei) . 






Substituting from (1) and (3), this first-order condition translates into
with the corresponding autarchic-internal cap-and-trade emissions price being
Thus, with constant marginal damages, in the unlinked case of this model it turns out that 
there is no strategic interaction among the n jurisdictions.
The total emissions of all jurisdictions, denoted Ê , is then
The free-riding voluntary autarchic emissions levels {êi} do not, by a wide margin, repre-
sent socially optimal emission levels. The socially optimal level of ei , denoted e∗i  , satisfies 












dj) and which clearly represents a lower level of emissions than êi given by Eq. 
(4).
The total socially optimal emissions level of all jurisdictions is then
which is clearly lower than the free-riding total emissions Ê given by Eq. (6). The cor-
responding uniform shadow price of socially optimal emissions (that also ensures cost 
effectiveness) is p∗ = 
∑





di∕n . However, as an extension of the argument about cost 
effectiveness given in the Introduction, socially optimal levels of CO
2
 emissions or the 
socially optimal shadow emissions price of CO
2
 are largely irrelevant for strictly volun-
tary cap-and-trade systems with no overarching top–down governance structure that can 
determine the initial allocation of CO
2
 caps and penalize non-compliance. Absent such a 
powerful overall governance structure, the socially optimal solution in a strictly voluntary 
cap-and-trade system loses much of its rationale.
4  Linked Cap‑and‑Trade Systems
Suppose that the n jurisdictions have been persuaded to link their cap-and-trade systems. 
We now investigate the steady-state Nash-equilibrium outcome of such linking. This case 
presents far more of an analytical challenge than the case of unlinked cap-and-trade sys-
tems due to the strategic interaction among linked jurisdictions.
Note that even though we presume that all jurisdictions play individually and non-
cooperatively against all other jurisdictions, some aspects of the rules of the game must 
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market, must be enforced. A jurisdiction must reveal its post-cap-and-trade permits to 
ensure consistency with its actual post-cap-and-trade emissions. (This is the meaning of 
Paragraph 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, previously referred to.)
Let the actual post-cap-and-trade emissions of jurisdiction i be denoted ea
i
 . For any 
given exogenously-imposed CO
2
 permit (or allowance) price P, the actual-emissions reac-
tion of jurisdiction i is obtained by the condition −C�
i
(ei(P)) = P . This condition yields the 








 represent total actual post-cap-and-trade emissions. We now seek to 
find the equilibrium permit price for the linked cap-and-trade system as a function of total 
actual emissions, denoted P(Ea) . Looking at actual emissions and adding up expression (8) 
over all i, we obtain Ea(P) =
∑
ei(P) , which, when inverted, yields the basic equation for 
the equilibrium permit price as a function of total actual emissions, namely P(Ea).
Next, let ec
i
 represent the emissions permits or caps issued voluntarily by jurisdiction i. 




 to be 
the total voluntary emissions caps or permits, and note that in equilibrium Ec = Ea . Let 
ẽc
i
 represent the Nash-equilibrium self-interested number of voluntary emissions permits 
issued by jurisdiction i, contingent on Nash-equilibrium self-interested voluntary emis-
sions permits ẽc
j
 for all other jurisdictions j ≠ i . Then ẽc
i
 must  maximize over all possible 
voluntary emissions caps ec
i
 the expression
where we understand ea
i
 in expression (9) as being some implicit function of ec
i
.
The second term of (9), in round brackets, represents the loss of welfare to jurisdiction i 
from emissions damages and costs.

















) , which renders the expression in the curly 




 , then juris-







 emissions permits, earning it a cash rev-




) , which renders the expression in the curly brackets of (9) positive, 
reflecting cash inflows into jurisdiction i. To summarize here, the expression in the curly 
brackets of (9) exactly equals the net cash flow into jurisdiction i from inter-jurisdictional 
tradable permits.
The Nash-equilibrium linked cap-and-trade actual emissions of jurisdiction i is denoted 
ẽa
i
 . Taking derivatives with respect to ec
i
 and making use of (1), the first-order condition for 
ẽc
i
 to maximize over all ec
i












 be total Nash-equilibrium emissions in the linked cap-and-trade 
system. Then the expression in the first term of the left hand side of Eq. (10) can be evalu-
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Next, substitute (11) into Eq. (10). After rearranging terms, we then derive
The term within the square brackets on the left hand side of (12) is zero because price 
equals marginal abatement cost in a cap-and-trade system. The first-order condition (12) 
then becomes
Add up over all i the expression (13), yielding the equation
In equilibrium,
so that the last term of the left hand side of Eq. (14) vanishes, turning Eq. (14) into
Define d to be the average marginal damage across all n jurisdictions
and let P̃ ≡ P(Ẽ) be the equilibrium price of permits in the linked cap-and-trade system. 
Then we have from (16) and (17) the fundamental result that
It should be appreciated that Eq. (18) has been derived under extremely general assump-
tions about the abatement cost functions. The only substantive assumption, which accounts 
for the utter simplicity of expression (18), is the eminently defensible specification that 
marginal damages are constant for CO
2
 emissions within a relatively short (5–10 year) 
period.
5  Linked versus Unlinked Cap‑and‑Trade
We have already derived for the unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade system that the self-
volunteered autarchic price of permit within jurisdiction i is p̂i = di . Define P̂ to be the 
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Then, making use of (5), (17), and (19), Eq. (18) can be rewritten as
which means that the linked voluntary permit price is the average of the unlinked volun-
tary permit prices. Equations (18) and (19) provide a clear analytical image of the equilib-
rium price of permits in the linked cap-and-trade system.
We have repeatedly relied on the simplifying, but justified, assumption that, within a 
relatively short period (say 5–10 years), marginal damages are constant for each juris-
diction. Using this simplifying assumption again, how a linked jurisdiction sets its 
voluntary caps relative to actual emissions (and whether the jurisdiction buys or sells 
CO
2
 permits) is fully characterized by a simple condition depending on the relationship 
between the jurisdiction’s marginal damages and the average marginal damages of the 
entire linked system.
From (18), P̃(E) ≡ P̃ = d , and then Eq. (13) can be rewritten as
where
is viewed by all jurisdictions i as the same positive constant of proportionality.
Equation (21) is revealing. The only instrument under direct control of jurisdiction 
i is its voluntary cap ec
i
 . Controlling the setting of its own voluntary cap ec
i
 is the only 




 . It 









) relatively high? The natu-




) is a comparison with the actual 
post-cap-and-trade emissions of i – namely ẽa
i
 . For all jurisdictions i, the actual equilib-
rium emissions ẽa
i










 and because {ẽa
i
} represents actual emissions normed to the  same common 












 is directly proportional to 
d − di with the same constant of proportionality k > 0 for all i. This implies two qualita-
tive results:
and
The interpretation of condition (23) should be relatively clear. When the marginal damage 
di to jurisdiction i is greater than the average marginal damages of the entire linked system 




 to be relatively lower, in order to cut 































> 0 emissions permits to counter-balance the relatively low setting of its volun-
tary cap.
The interpretation of condition (24) should likewise be relatively clear [but in the oppo-
site direction of (23)]. When the marginal damage di to jurisdiction i is less than the aver-





 to be relatively higher, in order to allow total emissions to be higher, a direction 
toward which jurisdiction i is relatively tolerant because di is relatively low. In this case, 







> 0 emissions permits to counter-
balance the relatively high setting of its voluntary cap, which is part of its motivation to 
issue relatively higher emissions permits.
How do total emissions compare between linked and unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade 
systems? Going back to Eq. (3), we can derive a simple condition for comparing total emis-
sions, which, unfortunately, is not so simple to understand completely. A linked cap-and-
trade system emits less in total than an unlinked cap-and-trade system if
and conversely a linked voluntary cap-and-trade system emits more in total than an 
unlinked cap-and-trade system if
Each of the n terms of (25) and (26) can be signed. If di > d , then ei(di) < ei(d) (with inter-




This signing of ei(⋅) terms might be interpreted as hinting that the right and left hand sides 
of (25) and (26) might not differ greatly from each other since roughly half of the jurisdic-
tions have the inequality in ei(⋅) going one way and roughly the other half have the inequal-
ity in ei(⋅) going the other way. However, this is merely crude heuristic hand-waving, not a 
formal argument.
Conditions (25) and (26) are not easy to analyze rigorously and could go either way, 
depending here on the distribution of the {di} and the functions {ei(⋅)} . The literature is not 
decisive on this issue. Plausible arguments have been made on both sides.6
It is also difficult to characterize in general whether a jurisdiction has higher welfare 
from joining a linked cap-and-trade system or from remaining autarchic. It might have 
been presumed on basic principles of trade theory that joining a linked cap-and-trade sys-
tem (offering a quasi-constant permit price of emissions) delivers higher welfare to a juris-
diction than remaining at the fixed autarchic level of emissions. However, this presumption 
does not hold in general for the situation here, where jurisdictions are gaming the system 



















6 For example, Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) plausibly argue that total emissions are likely to be 
higher under linked voluntary cap-and-trade than under unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade. On the other 
hand, Carbone et al. (2009) plausibly argue that total emissions are likely to be lower under linked volun-
tary cap-and-trade than under unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade. Both of these two examples involve static 
games (as does this paper). In a dynamic model with both fossil fuels and renewables, Holtsmark and Midt-
tømme (2016) argue that linking leads to lower emissions. At this stage we think it is an open question how 
linking of cap-and-trade systems influences emissions.
7 Section III of Godal and Holtsmark (2011) contains just such a counterexample where joining a linked 
cap-and-trade system yields lower welfare to a jurisdiction than remaining at the fixed autarchic level of 
emissions. In this paper we restrict ourselves to comparing linked and unlinked cap-and-trade systems with-
out inquiring deeply into the individual motivations for participating in a linked system.
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6  Numerical Illustrations
In this section, the theoretical results of the previous sections are illustrated by reporting 
a set of model simulations in which  nine jurisdictions link their cap-and-trade systems 
according to the set of rules that were assumed in the preceding sections.
6.1  Data Sources and Calibration
A partial equilibrium model was calibrated based on two data sources. While the parame-
ters of the abatement cost functions and uncontrolled emissions are based on data provided 
by McKinsey (2009), estimated marginal damage costs from CO
2
-emissions are based on 
Nordhaus (2015).
Nordhaus’s model included six regions in addition to the  EU, Brazil, Japan, Canada, 
the USA, Russia, India, South Africa and China. Because our theoretical approach is appli-
cable to a set of independent jurisdictions, our model includes the eight mentioned countries 
and the EU, while the six (other) regions in Nordhaus’s model were not included. The nine 
jurisdictions included in the model together represent approximately 72 percent of global CO
2
-emissions.8
Table 1 shows the estimated marginal damage costs of the included jurisdictions. The first 
column includes estimates that assume that marginal damages are proportional to national 
GDPs. The second column shows estimates of marginal damages from the RICE 2010 model. 
The third column shows estimates of marginal damages based on the average of three widely 
used models (DICE-RICE, FUND, PAGE).
As in Nordhaus (2015), the set of GDP-based marginal damage cost estimates (the first 
column of Table 1) was used as the reference case. Results from simulations based on the two 
other sets of marginal damage costs are reported and discussed more briefly than the reference 
case.
The quadratic abatement cost functions are:
Table 1  Estimates of the 
jurisdictions’ marginal damage 
costs. USD/tCO
2
Source: Nordhaus (2015, the online appendix, Table B-2, p. 15)




Brazil 3.1 2.4 2.9
Japan 4.8 2.3 2.4
EU 18.5 12.1 13.8
Canada 1.6 0.9 1.0
US 17.0 10.2 10.6
Russia 3.5 3.4 3.5
India 6.5 11.6 11.7
South Africa 0.7 0.7 0.7
China 14.8 15.8 11.0
Average 7.8 6.6 6.4
8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018.
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where ci is a parameter, eui  and ei represent uncontrolled and actual emissions of jurisdic-
tion i, respectively. Corresponding to (3), emissions without and with linking, respectively, 
become:
It follows that if an emission level ēi corresponds to marginal abatement cost p̄i , then the 
parameter ci can be calibrated using the following formula:
 McKinsey (2009) included both a 2020 scenario and a 2030 scenario. Originally the 
model was calibrated to both the 2020 and the 2030 data and both cases were simulated. 
In the following, however, only the results from the model calibrated to the 2020 data are 
reported because results of the two exercises were quite similar.
The first column of Table  2 shows the estimates of the 9 jurisdictions’ uncontrolled 
emissions in 2020. The second column shows estimated potential abatement that could be 
achieved if per-unit abatement costs do not exceed €60/tCO
2
 in 2020.9 The last column of 
Table 2 shows the calibrated parameter values when the calibration formula given by Eq. 


























Table 2  Estimates of the 
regions’ uncontrolled emissions 
(mearsured in  GtCO2/
year), abatement potential at 
a cost of up to €60/tCO
2
 , and 
calibrated cost parameters
Source: Uncontrolled emissions and abatement potentials are  taken 
from the 2020-case of McKinsey (2009). In  the calibration of cost 








Brazil 3.1 1.9 34.6
Japan 1.5 0.3 219.2
EU 5.3 1.2 54.8
Canada 0.8 0.2 328.8
US 7.7 2.0 32.9
Russia 2.9 0.7 93.9
India 3.3 1.0 65.8
S.Africa 0.6 0.2 328.8
China 13.9 3.5 18.8
9 McKinsey (2009,  p. 148) states that “Following the IPCC definitions, the abatement cost curve shows 
technical measures with economic potential under 60 €/tCO
2
e.”
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6.2  Simulation Results
In the unlinked case, jurisdiction i seeks to minimize over ei the expression Di(E) + Ci(ei), 
which gives emissions êi . Results of simulation of the unlinked reference case are given by 
Table 3.
In the linked case, jurisdiction i seeks to maximize over ec
i





) − (Di(E) + Ci(e
a
i
)) and the solution is denoted ẽc
i
 . With the quadratic abate-
ment cost function specified in (27), the first-order condition (13) gives the following vol-
untary caps with linking:
Table 3  Simulations results. Unlinked cap-and-trade systems. Reference case. Emissions in GtCO
2
/year. 
Costs and welfare in billions USD/year
∗ Reduction of damage costs compared to the case with uncontrolled emissions
∗∗ Increased welfare compared to the case with uncontrolled emissions














Abatement costs Effects on wel-
fare∗∗
Brazil 3.01 5.9 0.139 5.7
Japan 1.48 9.1 0.053 9.1
EU 4.96 35.1 3.123 32.0
Canada 0.80 3.0 0.004 3.0
US 7.18 32.2 4.395 27.9
Russia 2.86 6.6 0.065 6.6
India 3.20 12.3 0.321 12.0
South Africa 0.60 1.3 0.001 1.3
China 13.11 28.1 5.829 22.2
Sum 37.20 133.7 13.929 119.8
Table 4  Simulation results. Linked cap-and-trade systems. Reference case. Emissions and caps in GtCO
2
/
year. Costs, cash inflows and welfare in billions USD/year
∗ Reduction of damage costs compared to the case with uncontrolled emissions
∗∗Increased welfare compared to the case with uncontrolled emissions
























Brazil 2.87 4.1 3.67 6.2 0.886 9.4
Japan 1.46 6.3 1.97 4.0 0.140 10.1
EU 5.16 24.2 3.37 −14.0 0.560 9.7
Canada 0.78 2.1 1.82 8.2 0.093 10.2
US 7.46 22.3 5.93 −12.0 0.933 9.3
Russia 2.82 4.6 3.54 5.7 0.327 9.9
India 3.18 8.5 3.40 1.7 0.467 9.8
South Africa 0.58 0.9 1.77 9.3 0.093 10.2
China 13.48 19.4 12.32 −9.1 1.633 8.6
Sum 37.79 92.4 37.79 0.0 5.132 87.2
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The results of simulating the reference case with linking are given in Table 4. The average 
marginal damage cost in the reference case is 7.8 USD/tCO
2
 . This marginal cost becomes 
the equilibrium price of permits in the linked cap-and-trade system, see (18).




 , is 
directly proportional to d − di with the same constant of proportionality k for all i. Given 
the numerical assumptions, k = 0.167.
According to expression (23), jurisdictions with marginal damage costs, di , higher 
than average, set their voluntary cap lower than their total emissions and end up buying 
permits. This applies to the EU, the US and China, in the reference case. These juris-
dictions end up with negative cash inflows, see Table 4. Because the permit price with 
linking is lower than the marginal damage costs of these three jurisdictions, their emis-
sions are higher with linked cap-and-trade systems compared to the unlinked case. At 
the same time, their caps are set tighter. The reason for this is that the cost of reducing 
(global) emissions on the margin is reduced for these jurisdictions when they link their 
markets with the other jurisdictions.
Six jurisdictions have in the reference case marginal damage costs lower  than aver-
age, and opposite mechanisms come into play. In accordance with (24), they end up 
selling permits and collect positive cash inflows. The emissios of these six jurisdictions 
are lower with linking compared to the unlinked case. Note also that their caps are even 
greater than their uncontrolled emissions, see Tables 2 and 4.10
In the reference case, the total emissions of the nine jurisdictions are 1.6 percent higher 
with linked cap-and-trade systems compared to the cases without linking, see Table 5. This 
table also shows the effects on total emissions when the two other sets of damage cost esti-
mates are applied. In all cases, linking leads to increased emissions. However, as indicated in 
our discussion in relation to the conditions (25) and (26), the total emissions for linked volun-
tary cap-and-trade systems do not differ very much from the  emissions for unlinked systems.
Linking provides  an efficient allocation of abatement efforts, with lower total abate-
ment costs compared to the unlinked case. At the same time, linking results in higher total 
emissions. Because total emissions already in the first place were inefficiently high, this 
represents a welfare loss. It turns out that the welfare losses due to increased emissions 
with linking in all three cases considered are greater than the reduction of abatement costs 
from efficient allocation of abatement efforts. In all cases considered, welfare is therefore 













Table 5  Total emissions and welfare in the cases with linked voluntary cap-and-trade systems. Change 
from the case without linking
Effects on: Reference case Case with damages 
according to RICE 2010
Case with average 
damages of three 
models
Emissions (percentage change) +1.6 +1.5 +1.1
Welfare (billion USD/year) −32.56 −26.48 −18.80
10 Helm (2003) pointed out that this could be the result.
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7  Concluding Remarks
An appropriate and widely accepted specification for the marginal damages of CO
2
 emis-
sions within a relatively short (5–10 years, say) period is that they are constant for each 
jurisdiction. This critical, but defensible, assumption greatly clarifies the analysis of link-
age of cap-and-trade systems and yields simple closed-form expressions for all (linked and 
unlinked) CO
2
 emissions prices. The current paper has derived and discussed some impli-
cations of this simplicity for linked and unlinked voluntary CO
2
 cap-and-trade systems. 
How a linked jurisdiction sets its voluntary caps relative to actual emissions (and whether 
the jurisdiction buys or sells CO
2
 permits) is fully characterized by a simple linear propor-
tionality condition that depends only on the difference between the jurisdiction’s marginal 
damages and the average marginal damages of the entire linked system. Whether linkage 
increases or decreases overall emissions depends on a condition that is easy to express but 
difficult to evaluate rigorously, and the answer could go either way.
Because our theoretical results were ambiguous, we calibrated and simulated a partial 
equilibrium model which includes nine jurisdictions that in 2017 together were responsible 
for 72.8 percent of global CO
2
-emissions (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018). We 
applied three different sets of marginal damage costs provided by Nordhaus (2015). In all 
three considered cases, the simulations of linkage resulted in slightly greater overall emis-
sions compared to the simulations of unlinked national cap-and-trade markets.
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